John Schneider's cast-iron fortitude

Last time we talked, I mentioned that I’m going to spend less time trying to predict what will happen and more time trying to tell you what has occurred.

So I’m not going to tell you whether I think the Seahawks will be better off with Sam Darnold in 2025 than they would have been had they kept Geno Smith. We’re all going to find out the answer to that question together.

What I will try and do is explain the rationale that John Schneider used in making this decision because it’s in line with the process he has used since arriving here in 2010. You may not agree with the process in this instance, but Schneider has a pretty strong record when it comes to navigating these decisions.

Before we get there, though, let’s take a look at how you’re feeling. On Monday, I sent out a poll asking people to choose what best described their emotions after the trades of D.K. Metcalf and Geno Smith. Here were the results:

A selection of the best comments can be found here.

I would like to pause for a moment and acknowledge that whatever shortcomings or flaws you think Seattle’s general manager possesses, a lack of courage is not among them.

Not only was he willing to trade his starting quarterback for a third-round pick, he traded that starting quarterback to the team that is now coached by the guy his franchise fired a little more than a year ago.

This has the potential to look bad. REALLY bad. And if the Raiders were to finish with more wins than the Seahawks this season, well, I could see that being the sort of thing that could prompt an owner to give someone else the keys to the franchise.

However, as understandable as it may be to want to avoid looking bad, I think that’s a terrible way to run a franchise. If Seattle decided not to keep Geno Smith, it should trade him for the best draft pick it can get. The only exception would be if you wanted to avoided trading him within the division. The fact John Schneider traded Smith to the Raiders shows that he’s not worried about managing how things appear or how they look. I think that’s a good thing.

I tried to convey this with a pair of Tweets earlier this week:

The first Tweet, in case you’re unfamiliar, is Sam Cassell, demonstrating his testicular health after hitting a particularly big shot while playing with Kevin Garnett and Latrell Sprewell in Minnesota.

The bottom picture is an Eazy E look alike from a Dr. Dre video in which the diminutive rapper is reduced to rhyming for sustenance near a freeway on-ramp.

OK. Now let’s get back to the decision itself.

This about the process as well as the player

It is inevitable and totally fair that we will spend the entirety of next season comparing how Darnold performs in Seattle to how Smith plays with Las Vegas.

It is not a perfect apples-to-apples comparison of course. Darnold is 7 years younger, and it’s generally thought the Seahawks signed him for significantly less than it would have taken to extend Smith.

Still, Seattle had Smith, and the Seahawks decided they’d be fine with Darnold instead.

If you believe that Smith is good enough as a quarterback to lead Seattle on a postseason run, well, you think this was a mistake. And it very well may be a mistake.

I don’t think Schneider was certain about this, though. At least not certain enough to offer the contract Smith was seeking.

Now there has been some conflicting information on what exactly the Seahawks offered Smith. Albert Breer of Sports Illustrated said it was in the neighborhood of $35 million annually. Bob Condotta of The Seattle Times said it was between $40 million and $45 million. Brady Henderson of ESPN pointed out that the terms of Darnold’s deal were certainly less than what it would have taken to sign Smith.

I tend to think that the guarantees and structure of the contract were likely a bigger issue for Smith and his representatives than the average compensation.

I base that (mostly) on history. As I mentioned earlier this week, the Seahawks found themselves in a similar spot back in 2011. Matt Hasselbeck was a year older than Smith currently is, and Hasselbeck was a free agent while Smith had a year left on his deal.

But the Seahawks offered to extend Hasselbeck. He didn’t accept that offer, and while Matt never stated exactly why, I was told it was because the second year of that deal was not fully guaranteed. He thought that pointed to the likelihood he’d be gone after a single season.

Again, the situations aren’t identical. Smith still had a year left on his deal. However, I suspect the sticking point came down to the length of guarantee as opposed to annual salary.

This is consistent with how Schneider has operated when it comes to planning at quarterback. He is very measured when it comes to making long-term commitments to players at that position. He’s never traded up in the draft order to get “his guy.” He hasn’t swung on sign-and-trades to land someone to fill that role.

He makes small, manageable bets and sees where they go. He doesn’t always hit. Charlie Whitehurst was not good. Tarvaris Jackson was a placeholder. Matt Flynn was a waste of money.

But Russell Wilson was a home run. So was the decision to trade him before he signed that third contract that Denver wound up eating.

Schneider isn’t always right about quarterbacks, but he’s never made an all-in investment on a guy who turned out to be a bad fit at that position.

Also: There has never been an example in which his decision to let go of a quarterback — even a very good one — came back to bite the franchise. Everyone thought that was going to happen with Wilson. It didn’t. Going back to Schneider’s time in Green Bay, working under Ted Thompson, he was part of the Packers’ switch from Brett Favre to Aaron Rodgers.

Maybe this will be different, and the decision to trade Smith will come back and bite Seattle and Schneider. That would require me to make a prediction, though. And as I said earlier this week, I’m easing out of that practice.